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Good morning.
The question posed for this panel, about the relationship between weapons
of mass destruction (hereinafter "WMD") related noncompliance findings and
what you have tactfully described as exceptional actions by states acting
together or acting unilaterally, is a provocative and important one. In order to
help enrich your deliberations, I would like to offer some observations upon
these matters from the perspective of an official whose job it is at the State
Department to do compliance assessments. To begin with, I'd like to say a few
words to outline what we mean when we talk about a noncompliance finding.
I. THE COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
I serve as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Compliance Policy in something called the Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at the U.S. Department of State
(hereinafter "VCr'). VCI is a very young bureau, having been established by
statute only in 1999,' but it is in some ways the direct descendent of the
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1. Pub. Law No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-486), § 11 12(c)(1) (creating Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification and Compliance to have "principal responsibility [for] the overall supervision
(including oversight of policy and resources) within the U.S. Department of State on all matters relating to
verification and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements
or conmiitments"). The new Assistant Secretary, the statute specified, was to "participate in all interagency
groups or organizations within the executive branch of Government that assess, analyze, or review United
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Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support Bureau (hereinafter "IVF')
of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereinafter "ACDA").
Among our responsibilities is taking the lead role within the U.S. Government
in arriving at compliance findings for arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament agreements and commitments. This includes, most prominently,
drafting the President's congressionally-mandated annual report to Congress
that identifies instances of noncompliance with such agreements and
commitments, and outlines compliance concerns related thereto. The most
recent report-the longest and most detailed ever, running to a total of over 700
pages in three versions published at different levels of classification-was just
issued in August. You can find the unclassified version on our Bureau's
website.2
States planned or ongoing policies, programs, or actions that have a direct bearing on verification or
compliance matters, including interagency intelligence committees concerned with the development or
exploitation of measurement or signals intelligence or other national technical means of verification." Id. §
1112(c)(2)(A). The Assistant Secretary was also to be "the principal policy community representative to the
intelligence community on verification and compliance matters." Id. § 11 12(c)(3). Congress had disagreed
with the State Department's reorganization plan-which had proposed to divide the verification staff
functions of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) between a "Special Advisor" to the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and a Deputy Assistant Secretary within the
then-Arms Control Bureau-and opted instead to give "the verification and compliance aspects of arms
control agreements... a voice at the most senior level of the Administration" by creating a purpose-specific
Assistant Secretary. Id. "A true commitment to vigorous enforcement of arms control and nonproliferation
agreements and sanctions," said the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "cannot be maintained by
submerging compliance analysis within other bureaus." S. REP. No. 106-43, at 28 (1999); see also Jesse
Helms & Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Letter to William J. Clinton, at 1 (Feb. 24, 1999) (expressing concern that
"under your plan, the function of verification and compliance or arms control treaties would not be carried
out by a separate bureau"). The leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had also expressed
similar concerns. See Richard C. Shelby & J. Robert Kerrey, Letter to Madeleine K. Albright, at 2 (Sept. 15,
1997) (urging creation of separate "Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance to maintain
the integrity of the verification and compliance process, and to protect the credibility within the Senate of the
Department's assessments in this area").
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION,
ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WrrH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/c 15720.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2006). The report is drafted by the Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation but by law is a Presidential report. See 22 U.S.C. § 2593a(a)(4) (requiring President to
submit "a detailed assessment of the adherence of other nations to obligations undertaken on all arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments, including the Missile Technology Control
Regime, to which the United States is a participating state, including information on actions taken by each
nation with regard to the size, structure, and disposition of its military forces in order to comply with arms
control, nonproliferation, or disarmament agreements or commitments" including "a specific identification,
to the maximum extent practicable in unclassified form, of each and every question that exists with respect
to compliance by other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements with the
United States"). The President has delegated authority to the Secretary of State to sign the report and submit
it to Congress on his behalf. See Delegation of Certain Congressional Reporting Functions, Exec. Order No.
Anyway, we do compliance assessments for a living, and I'd like to talk
a little bit about what goes into them. In our diplomatic engagement with other
governments on compliance-related matters, it has become apparent that many
do not understand the complexity and rigor of the U.S. compliance assessment
process. They sometimes seem to assume that we reach compliance findings
as mere issues of policy preference-as if we just sit around a table and
someone declares that "I don't like that country, so they must be guilty of
noncompliance with something." In fact, I fear that is how some governments
probably make such decisions. But we certainly don't.
The U.S. process, as shown in the preparation of the annual Noncom-
pliance Report, is a long and complex one that involves the entire interagency
community and detailed clearance procedures in which officials sometimes
argue at length over subtle nuances of phrasing and, yes, even punctuation. The
text of the report is cleared by all relevant parts of the policy community-
including the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and the National
Security Council staff-as well as by the U.S. Intelligence Community. This
elaborate and often difficult process is quite appropriate; the report is, by law,
the President's report and it represents the findings of the U.S Government as
a whole, not just one or more components of it.
Conceptually, the process begins with trying to ensure that we have a clear
understanding of the obligations in question. These obligations can come in
many forms, ranging from formal treaties such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (hereinafter "NPT"), to informal, voluntary arrangements among a group
of countries such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (hereinafter
"MTCR"), to United Nations resolutions such as UNSCR 1540, which commits
nations to undertake efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD.
It is often imagined that compliance analysts spend most of their time
arguing over facts and over interpretations of intelligence information, but
interestingly, it is often the meaning of the underlying obligation that causes
intense discussion and debate. This highlights the point that compliance
analysis is different from intelligence analysis. To be sure, compliance analysis
depends upon intelligence, which must be assessed and understood. But
compliance analysis also involves legal analysis, because one needs to be able
to explain what a country is required to do before one can judge whether that
country has done it. Ultimately, all this requires a policy judgment as to
whether the facts constitute a violation when held up against a promise or an
obligation.
It's also worth noting that for compliance assessment purposes, some of
the things over which intelligence analysts spend their time arguing are not
13313,68 Fed. Reg. 46073 (July 31,2003), at § 1 (a)(15), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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always of primary importance. There may be different views, for instance,
about when a certain country will have come into possession of a workable
nuclear weapon, or how many weapons they currently have. Those are vital
questions for the Intelligence Community, and for policymakers whose job it
is to reduce or counter the national security threats represented by such
capabilities. For a compliance analyst, however, the key may often simply be
whether the country in question is trying to develop nuclear weapons at all,
which, for NPT non-nuclear weapons states, is the key to identifying a potential
Article II violation.3
II. NONCOMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
So that's the compliance assessment process. But for today's purposes,
the most interesting discussions will likely be about the implications of
noncompliance. And this is indeed where some of the most important
challenges lie in our world of verification and compliance.
Dr. Fred Ickl, who went on to become head of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, wrote an article in 1961 for Foreign Affairs magazine
which made a very important point that holds true today. The title of his article
was After Detection ... What?,4 and this title nicely summaries his point.
Verification capabilities are clearly crucial in the arms control, nonprolifera-
tion, and disarmament world. One needs to be able to detect violations in time
to be able to do something about them. But that's the rub. Detection alone is
of little value. Detection serves its purpose only by providing a foundation for,
and warning timely enough to permit, effective action in compliance
enforcement. There is no way around the need for taking action to counter the
threat posed by a violation, return the violator to compliance, and deter others
from following in his footsteps.
This is a lesson unfortunately underscored by recent events. Even though
the world has long since learned of Iran's flagrant noncompliance with its
nuclear safeguards obligations and with Article II of the NPT, the international
community is still having a difficult time making such noncompliance costly
and unattractive-either to Tehran or to any country that might contemplate
following Iran's path in the future. The international community is also
3. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IL Apr. 22, 1970, 729 U.N.T.S.
161 ("Each non-nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes... not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.") [hereinafter Non-Prolifeiation Treaty].
See also NOTIFICATION TO INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) OF TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAR. 5, 1970 ENTRY INTO FORCE, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Otherstinfcirel40.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
4. Fred Charles Ickl6, After Detection-What?, 39:2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 208-20, Jan. 1961.
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struggling to agree upon how to provide a "what" in response to North Korea's
even more obvious violations of the NPT. Dr. Ickld was, I believe, right to
suggest that it can often be even harder to mount an effective response than it
is to detect violations in the first place.
But what sort of response is appropriate, and when is it permitted?
A. Finding the Balance
You will probably find our Bureau second to none in advocating firm
responses to compliance problems. After all, it is important that all violations
-- or at least all deliberate ones, anyway--elicit some compliance pressure
aimed at making noncompliance expensive, difficult, annoying, or dangerous.
The proliferators of today have learned lessons from how the international
community has handled noncompliance in the past, and it seems clear that
tomorrow's would-be proliferators will learn from the choices we make in
responding to today's proliferation challenges. Not taking violations seriously,
wherever they occur-thereby sending the message that compliance is not
important, or is negotiable-can have grave consequences in undermining our
ability to stand firm when it matters most. As a result, we believe it important
for the U.S. to be a stickler for compliance rigor, and to engage in vigorous
efforts to ensure compliance enforcement-a role, incidentally, which we feel
to be the responsibility of all members of the international community, jointly
and severally.
But it is also clear that not all failings are equally dangerous. South Korea,
for instance, engaged in a few undeclared uranium enrichment and plutonium-
separation experiments inconsistent with its obligations under its nuclear
safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(hereinafter "IAEA"). In stark contrast, Iran carried on a twenty-year
clandestine program to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle capable of producing,
and clearly intended to produce, fissile material usable in nuclear weapons.
Clearly, Iran's activities are far more threatening to international peace and
security.
Both cases represented compliance difficulties, but the dangers they
present-and the responses these different efforts should therefore elicit-vary
enormously. South Korea quickly cleaned up its act when the IAEA brought
the problem to its attention, so no response beyond mere chastisement was
5. I do not address here the problem of a state that fails to comply with an obligation on account
of error, incompetence, or forces beyond its control. In some such cases (e.g., those of simple error), mere
detection of noncompliance may, alone, lead to redress. In others, remedying noncompliance may present
capacity-building challenges (e.g., it may take time and money to fix things). These problems, however, are
different from the challenges presented by a willful violation-with which both Dr. Ickld and I are principally
concerned.
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needed. Iran, however, seems intent upon retaining the fuel-cycle capabilities
it secretly acquired as part of its nuclear weapons effort, while North Korea
actually brags about achieving a weapons capability. Both Iran and North
Korea appear to need a good deal more compliance pressure than mere
admonishment.
Another interesting comparison is the case of Libya. The Libyans clearly
violated Article II of the NPT by engaging in a program to manufacture nuclear
weapons-which they aimed to do with the help of gas centrifuges for uranium
enrichment, and even nuclear weapons designs, acquired from the A.Q. Khan
proliferation network. Their program included undeclared possession of
uranium hexafluoride centrifuge feedstock in noncompliance with their
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and therefore in
noncompliance with Article II of the NPT.6 As a nuclear weapons develop-
ment program, this effort constituted a very serious noncompliance problem
indeed. But the context in which we learned the full details of these problems,
however, was one in which it was clear that Libya was on the road to reforming
its proliferating ways and eliminating its WMD programs.
So while noncompliance is always bad and should always elicit com-
pliance pressure in response, context is critical. Decisions about appropriate
responses to noncompliance can raise very complex and difficult questions, and
they require all sorts of policy, and sometimes legal determinations. There is
no substitute for good judgment and policy sense, and it may not be possible to
set down precise recipes ahead of time for which responses will be appropriate
in any particular case.
B. Counter-WMD Intervention
In extreme cases, particularly given the nature of the potential threats that
can be posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue
state-particularly one with ties to international terrorism-the repertoire of
potential responses to proliferation noncompliance may include military action.
Of course, any decision to take this course of action would require careful
6. See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 3, art. III ("Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillments of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be
followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used
in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall
be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.")
analysis of legal authorities and policy considerations, and would ultimately be
made at the highest levels of our government.
We are often asked when such action would be consistent with the United
Nations Charter and other principles of international law. It is impossible to
state a general rule here because, in the end, each use of force must look for its
legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the state believes have made it
necessary, and each such use of force should be judged, not against abstract
concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to it. In the case of Iraq, for
instance, the U.S. had ample authority under pertinent Security Council
resolutions to use force to compel compliance with WMD obligations in the
face of material breaches of Iraqi obligations under relevant resolutions of the
Security Council, including conditions that had been essential to the
establishment of the ceasefire in 1991. This is not to say, however, that
Security Council action is a sine qua non for the use of force in such cases, as
the doctrine of self-defense may be available to justify use of force in cases
where the Council has not acted. Each case must be judged on the particular
facts. This is why so many attempts to define bright-line rules describing the
circumstances in which the use of force is justified have come to naught.
C. Diplomacy and Counter-Proliferation
I would like to emphasize, however, that if we spend all our time debating
hypothetical scenarios of military intervention we will likely miss some very
important points about what can be done-and in fact is being done-to fight
WMD proliferation and prevent things from ever having to come to such a pass.
After all, it is now clear that skillful diplomacy can help create opportunities for
compliance enforcement far short of military intervention. Let me offer you
some examples:
1) This Administration's Proliferation Security Initiative
(hereinafter "PSI") and Dangerous Materials Initiative
(hereinafter "DMI"), for instance, are innovative approaches to
some of these problems that rely upon coordinated applications
of existing legal authorities to increase the costs and risks to
proliferators and smugglers of dangerous material around the
globe. We are working with like-minded friends and allies,
using well-established rules regarding ascertaining the true
nationality of vessels on the high seas or conducting medical,
safety, and customs inspections in ports of call, and securing
ship-boarding agreements with major flag states such as Panama
and Liberia. The U.S. is, by such means, making it much harder
for countries such as Libya to receive black market centrifuges,
for countries such as North Korea to ship missiles, illegal drugs,
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or counterfeit currency around the world, and for other rogue
states to acquire chemical weapon precursor materials or
ballistic missile components.
2) The U.S. is also now working with the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(hereinafter "NSG") to halt the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies while we endeavor to ensure reliable
alternative nuclear fuel supplies for countries that forswear such
proliferation-risky capabilities. Incidentally, just this past week
[October 17-18, 2005], in accordance with its recently revised
guidelines, the NSG also held an extraordinary plenary meeting
to consider the Iran issue in light of the IAEA Board of
Governors' resolution declaring Iran in noncompliance with its
safeguards obligations (and noting that this requires a U.N.
Security Council report).7 I'm pleased to note that at the NSG
plenary, the European Union announced that it would make no
transfers of NSG trigger list items to Iran and would exercise
special vigilance with regard to non-listed items that could
nonetheless be useful in enrichment and reprocessing.
3) The U.S. also uses a range of bilateral economic and diplomatic
pressures to fight WMD-related proliferation. These pressures
include sanctions laws passed by the U.S. Congress, many of
which are explicitly linked to specific international nonproli-
feration norms such as the NSG guidelines or the MTCR.
Through such mechanisms, we have made it harder and more
costly for would-be proliferators to do the wrong thing by
making it clear that one cannot be both a WMD proliferator and
a full trading partner of the world's largest economy.
4) Finally, the example of our successful efforts, first to negotiate,
and then to assist in the implementation of and ultimately to
verify Libya's elimination of its WMD programs, is also a very
important illustration of the innovative approaches being taken
to handle proliferation challenges. While we worked closely in
Libya with both the IAEA and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter "OPCW"), it is
important to note that most of our work in country was done on
a cooperative trilateral basis between the U.S., our British allies,
and our Libyan partners. Once Libya had made its strategic
commitment to renounce WMD, for example, it was possible to
work with the Libyans to eliminate their nuclear weapons
program--not merely to place seals on it and monitor it
7. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (2005), available at
http//www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
pursuant to IAEA safeguards. As far as we're concerned,
dismantlement and removal beats mere monitoring any day.
Thanks to patient diplomatic efforts and a keen U.S. focus upon stopping
WMD proliferation during 2004---coming on the heels of years of international
pressure on Libya in connection with terrorism, human rights, and regional
security problems-this Administration was able to achieve a tremendous
success in WMD rollback on a voluntary and cooperative basis.
I hope these examples make clear that there exist a great many tools for
policymakers whose job it is to cope with the threats posed by noncompliance
with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and
commitments. The military variety of compliance enforcement constitutes only
one tool in the toolbox. A finding of noncompliance should always produce
compliance enforcement response, but it does not, and should not, automatically
produce any particular response. Which tools will best suit the circumstances
at hand is something that we need to consider anew for each problem that
arises, as we tackle the policy challenges of fashioning remedies that address
the wrong, and that best serve U.S. national security interests and the interests
of international peace and security.
Ill. CONCLUSION
I hope that my discussion of the compliance assessment process and the
challenges of After Detection ... What? will help you better understand the
sometimes somewhat arcane world of compliance enforcement. So while I am
sorry that I offer today no bright line rules and clear recipes, I am not sure that
such things exist. Nonetheless, I hope I have been able to impress upon you
both the seriousness and the complexity of these challenges, and I look forward
to hearing some very interesting discussions today.
Thank you.
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